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Abstract
We consider a persuasion model in which a sender inﬂuences the actions of a receiver
by selecting an experiment (public signal) from a set of feasible experiments. We ask:
does the sender beneﬁt from becoming an expert — observing a private signal prior to
her selection? We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a sender to never gain
by becoming informed. Our key condition (sequential redundancy) shows that the in-
formativeness of public experiments can substitute for the sender’s expertise. We then
provide conditions for private information to strictly beneﬁt or strictly hurt the sender.
Expertise is beneﬁcial when the sender values the ability to change her experimental
choice according to her private information. When the sender does not gain from ex-
pertise, she is strictly hurt when diﬀerent types cannot pool on an optimal experiment.
JEL classiﬁcation: D83.
Keywords: Information design, Bayesian persuasion, experts.
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1 Introduction
A prosecutor would like to persuade a judge to convict a defendant. She can submit to
the court the testimony from one of several expert witnesses, who vary in their expertise
in evaluating the available evidence. Before choosing which testimony to submit, she has
private access to some information relevant to the case (e.g., she may be able to privately
ask the witnesses exploratory questions, or privately observe unoﬃcial reports from law
enforcement). Can she increase the chances of a conviction by accessing such information?
That is, is an “informed” prosecutor a more successful persuader?
We investigate this question in the broader setting of a sender (she) who can aﬀect the
decisions of a receiver (he) by controlling his information environment — as in Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) (KG henceforth).1 The receiver chooses the action a that maximizes
his utility uR(a, θ), where θ is an unknown state of the world. The sender wants to maximize
her utility uS(a, θ), and can inﬂuence the receiver’s action by providing a public signal (an
experiment) whose outcome is correlated with θ. We expand on the KG model in two ways.
First, the sender in our model might be constrained in her choice of an experiment; she must
choose one experiment π from a given set Π, but she can garble its outcome.2 For instance,
the prosecutor can frame the questions to the expert witness in a way that coarsens the
informativeness of his testimony, or she may refrain from asking certain questions altogether.
Second, the sender in our model privately observes the realization of an exogenous signal
πe before committing to an experiment π. The sender in KG commits to an experiment π
prior to observing any private information. We contrast this uninformed-sender case with
the case in which the sender is an expert.
Does the sender beneﬁt from becoming an expert? That is, does she prefer to observe
πe before choosing π, or does she prefer to commit to a public signal without observing
πe? The answers to these questions depend on the informational content of πe relative to
experiments in Π. We say that experiment πe is redundant given Π if, for every experiment
1See, also, Brocas and Carrillo (2007), Rayo and Segal (2010), Boleslavsky, Cotton, and Gurnani (2017),
Alonso and Caˆmara (2016a,b,c) and Bergemann and Morris (2016).
2Note that if the set Π has a signal πFI that is fully informative of the state θ, then the sender in our
model eﬀectively has access to the same signals as in KG.
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π ∈ Π, there is an experiment π′ ∈ Π such that π′ is at least as Blackwell-informative as
jointly observing the outcome of πe and π. In eﬀect, when the private signal is redundant,
disclosing its outcome alongside the outcome of any other experiment in Π does not generate
a more informative signal than what is already available through experiments in Π.
It is easy to see how a sender may beneﬁt from privately observing a non-redundant
signal: if she could credibly disclose its outcome, she could then convey more information to
the receiver than if uninformed.
While a sender may beneﬁt from observing non-redundant information, redundancy by
itself does not guarantee that the sender cannot gain from becoming an expert. In some
cases, even if πe is redundant given Π, she can use its outcome to revert to an experiment
that is more likely to induce the desired behavior in the receiver, as in the following example.
Example 1: πε redundant given Π, but positive value of expertise. A prosecutor
wants to persuade a judge that a defendant is corrupt. The prosecutor has evidence that the
defendant has a secret oﬀshore account, but she is not sure if it is in country A or country
B. The money in this account is either legal (the defendant is innocent (I)) or the result
of corruption (the defendant is guilty (G)). Consequently, there are four possible states,
{AI,AG,BI,BG}, representing where the defendant has an account and whether or not the
source of the money is legal. The prosecutor and the judge have uniform prior beliefs.
The judge will convict the defendant if and only if he learns that the defendant is guilty
for sure. The prosecutor receives payoﬀ 1 if the defendant is convicted, and zero otherwise.
The prosecutor has to choose one of two possible experiments. Experiment πA is a full
investigation of banks in country A, and reveals all information about country A but no
information about B. That is, it reveals partitions {AI}, {AG}, and {BI,BG}. Experiment
πB is a full investigation of country B and reveals partitions {AI,AG}, {BI}, and {BG}.
Without private information, the prosecutor’s optimal strategy is to select either investi-
gation and fully disclose its results. The conviction probability is only 25% in this case, since
the prosecutor might investigate the wrong country — i.e., the one in which the defendant
does not have an account. Now suppose that the prosecutor has access to a private source
of information πe that simply reveals the country of the account, resulting in partitions
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{AI,AG} and {BI,BG}. Note that πe is redundant given Π.3 Nevertheless, the prosecutor
strictly beneﬁts from this redundant private signal. The expert prosecutor launches the in-
vestigation of the country in which she knows the defendant has an account, increasing the
conviction probability to 50%. 
To understand how expertise is beneﬁcial in Example 1, note that experiments in Π
diﬀer in their informativeness, and the expert’s redundant signal can pinpoint which one
would ex-post reveal more information about the state. Our ﬁrst result shows that if this
is not the case, then a sender cannot beneﬁt from observing redundant information. More
precisely, Proposition 1 establishes that an uninformed sender is ex-ante (weakly) better oﬀ
than an expert for every uS(a, θ) and uR(a, θ) if and only if πe is sequentially redundant
given Π. Sequential redundancy implies that, for every possible selection rule in which
the sender ﬁrst observes the result of πe and then selects an experiment, there exists an
available experiment π′ that is at least as Blackwell-informative as the sender’s sequential
experimentation. In other words, sequential redundancy ensures that an uninformed sender
can always replicate both the expert’s private signal and her ensuing choice of experiment
by garbling an experiment in Π.
An important corollary of Proposition 1 is that if Π contains a fully informative exper-
iment, then a sender can never beneﬁt from privately observing πe, independently of the
utility functions uR(a, θ) and uS(a, θ) and the informational content of πe. This result shows
that the informativeness of available experiments can substitute for the sender’s expertise.
In fact, a necessary condition for a sender to beneﬁt from becoming an expert is that no
experiment in Π fully reveals the state.
While sequentially redundant private information can never beneﬁt the sender, redundant
private information can strictly beneﬁt or strictly hurt the sender. Sections 4 and 5 provide
suﬃcient conditions for these two cases. In Section 6, we apply our results to an important
economic phenomenon: the strategic use of real information in marketing (see Johnson and
Myatt 2006). We show that a retailer who can only oﬀer a limited set of experiments
to consumers strictly beneﬁts from a salesperson that is an expert and can, consequently,
3Actually, πe is redundant in a stronger sense: learning the outcome of πe after observing the outcome
of either πA or πB would not change the posterior beliefs of the sender.
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select the best experiment for each consumer. Interestingly, the same expert salesperson will
strictly hurt a retailer that has access to a fully informative signal. This happens because
the expert salesperson destroys the company’s ability to strategically garble the experiments
and hide information from the consumer. Therefore, this retailer beneﬁts from strategic
ignorance: hiring non-experts and limiting the training she provides to her salesforce.
Our paper is related to the recent literature that studies the strategic design of a public
signal by an informed sender. Gill and Sgroi (2008, 2012) consider a privately-informed
principal who can subject herself to a test that is informative of her type, and can optimally
choose the test’s diﬃculty. Li and Li (2013) study a privately-informed candidate who can
choose the accuracy of a costly public signal (campaign) about the qualiﬁcations of the
politicians competing for oﬃce. Degan and Li (2016) study a persuasion model in which
the sender privately knows the realized binary state and can provide a public signal to the
receiver — the cost of the signal to the sender increases in its precision. Rosar (2017) studies
test design by a principal who seeks to learn the binary quality of an imperfectly informed
agent, when test-taking by the agent is voluntary. Perez-Richet (2014) considers an informed
sender who might be constrained in her choice of a signal. In his model, the receiver can only
take two actions (validation or non-validation), and there are only two types of senders, both
of whom receive the same net payoﬀ from validation. In contrast to that paper, we consider
any ﬁnite set of types for the sender and ﬁnite action space for the receiver, and we allow for
general sender and receiver utility functions. Hedlund (2017) considers an informed sender
who has access to any signal that is correlated with the state (so the space of signals is the
same as in KG). He compares the equilibrium payoﬀs of a game in which the sender’s type is
private information and a game in which the sender’s type is public information. Both Perez-
Richet (2014) and Hedlund (2017) focus on characterizing the properties of equilibria, and
explore how diﬀerent reﬁnements narrow the equilibrium predictions. Our focus, however,
is on understanding the value of expertise in persuasion games. That is, we compare the
payoﬀ of a privately informed sender and the payoﬀ of an uninformed sender. In particular,
by looking at senders’ payoﬀs attainable in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we provide an
upper bound on the value of expertise.
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2 The Model
Our model features a game between a sender (she) and a receiver (he). The receiver chooses
an action that aﬀects the utility of both players. The sender can inﬂuence this choice by
supplying the receiver with a public signal (experiment) that is correlated with the state.
We contrast two cases. In the ﬁrst case, the sender has no private information about the
state, or, equivalently, she can commit to the signal before becoming privately informed (as
in KG). In the second case, the sender has private information about the state and cannot
commit to the public signal before becoming informed.
Preferences and Prior Beliefs: All players are expected utility maximizers and process infor-
mation according to Bayes’ rule. The receiver selects an action a from a ﬁnite set A, which
has at least two actions. We will relax this assumption and allow A to be a compact set for
some of our results. The sender and the receiver have preferences over actions characterized
by continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions uS(a, θ) and uR(a, θ), with θ ∈ Θ
and Θ a ﬁnite state space. Players share a common prior belief p belonging to the interior
of the simplex Δ (Θ).
Private Information: An experiment π is a Zπ-valued random variable that depends on the
state, with a ﬁnite realization space Zπ. The sender privately observes the realization of
experiment πe. Let the sender’s type t ∈ Δ(Θ) represent her interim belief after observing
zπe(t) ∈ Zπe—i.e., Pr[θ|zπe(t)] = tθ, and β(t) the probability of t. Let T be the (ﬁnite)
set of possible interim beliefs induced by πe, where, for simplicity, we assume that diﬀerent
realizations result in diﬀerent types. Bayes’ rule requires that Eβ[t] =
∑
t∈T β(t)t = p. The
set T and the probabilities β(t) are common knowledge. Throughout the paper, we contrast
two cases: T has a single element (the sender is uninformed) and T has at least two elements
(the sender is privately informed).
Feasible Experiments: After observing her private signal, but before the receiver chooses his
action, the sender supplies an experiment π formed from a ﬁnite set of feasible experiments
Π. All experiments π in Π carry the same cost to the sender, which we assume to be zero.
When comparing the informational content of diﬀerent experiments, we will consider the
Blackwell information order B (Blackwell 1953).
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We impose no special structure on the joint distribution of signal realizations of πe and
experiments in Π. For instance, we could have πe ∈ Π, so that the sender could certify her
type by supplying experiment πe. We also denote by πFI a fully informative experiment —
i.e., an experiment such that the posterior belief of a Bayesian decision maker puts non-zero
probability in at most one state.
Finally, we assume that the sender can costlessly garble any experiment π and select
arbitrary mixtures of experiments. A garbling of experiment π is an experiment whose re-
alizations are independent of θ and πe conditional on the realization of experiment π. Note
that by allowing for garblings implicitly allows the sender to engage in other forms of com-
munication. For instance, changing the labels associated to realizations in Zπ would mimic
cheap talk communication by the sender. A mixture λ is an experiment with realization
space Π × Z˜, where Z˜ = ×π∈ΠZ˜π, and Z˜π the space of realizations of a garbling of π, in
which λ(π) is the probability of selecting experiment π and observing the realization of its
garbling z˜π ∈ Z˜π. As the sender mixes among experiments without observing their actual
realizations, we assume that the choice of experiment is independent of these realizations
given their type, i.e. Prλ [(π, z˜)|t] = Pr (z˜|t)λ(π|t), π ∈ Π, z˜ ∈ Z˜, t ∈ T. We denote by
Γ (Π) the set of all possible mixtures of garblings of experiments in Π, so that the sender
supplies the receiver an experiment π ∈ Γ (Π). Following Blackwell (1953), this implies that
the sender also has access to any experiment that is less informative than any π ∈ Π. In
particular, if the sender has a fully informative signal available, then she can choose any
experiment that is correlated with the state (as in KG).
Timing: The sender privately learns her type t and then chooses an experiment π ∈ Γ (Π).
The receiver simultaneously observes π and its realization zπ ∈ Zπ, updates his beliefs, and
then chooses an action a ∈ A. Payoﬀs are then realized.
Sender’s Equilibrium Payoﬀ: We consider Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). We will hence-
forth use the term equilibrium to refer to a PBE. After observing experiment π and realiza-
tion zπ, the receiver updates his information consistently, taking into account equilibrium
strategies and the informational content of {π, zπ}. Following Perez-Richet (2014), oﬀ the
equilibrium path, if the hard information {π, zπ} is inconsistent with equilibrium strategies,
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then the hard information has preeminence on the receiver’s belief updating.
If experiment πe is uninformative, then the sender is uninformed, and we can use the re-
sults from KG to compute the sender’s maximum expected equilibrium payoﬀ VU . We refer
to the informed sender’s game to denote the case in which experiment πe is informative. Let
w = (w(t))t∈T , where w(t) is the expected payoﬀ of type t, and W ⊂ Rcard(T ) is the set of
type-dependent equilibrium payoﬀs of the sender. Let VI = supw∈W
∑
t∈T β(t)w(t). That is,
VI is the sender’s maximum ex-ante expected utility in the informed sender game. We refer
to VU as the value of persuasion by an uninformed sender and VI as the value of persuasion
by an expert.
2.1 Deﬁnitions
We now introduce some properties of the information environment that allows us to compare
the information that can be conveyed by an informed and an uninformed sender. For an
arbitrary set of experiments Π, we say that experiment πe is redundant given Π if for every
π ∈ Π, there exists π′ ∈ Π such that {πe, π} B π′, where {πe, π} refers to the experiment
in which the decision maker observes the realizations of both πe and π. In other words, πe
is redundant given Π if observing the outcome of πe in addition to the outcome of some
experiment π cannot generate more information than what is already available through
experiments in Π. Note that redundancy is diﬀerent from the notion of mutual information
(see Cover and Thomas 1991). For instance, if Π = {πFI} then we trivially have {πe, πFI} B
πFI for any choice of πe and yet knowing the state does not always allow the decision maker
to predict the outcome of πe.
Likewise, we say that experiment πe is strongly redundant given Π if for every π ∈ Π,
{πe, π} B π. In this case, a decision maker who observes π would never change his beliefs
if he then observes the realization of πe. In statistical terms, πe is strongly redundant given
Π if, for each π ∈ Π, π is a suﬃcient statistic for {πe, π} (DeGroot 1970).
The receiver may not be able to infer the sender’s type from the realization of π, even
when πe is strongly redundant given π. We say that πe can be replicated with π if there
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exists a T−valued garbling of π, denoted by gπ, such that
Pr [πe = gπ ◦ π] = 1. (1)
Therefore, if π is available, the sender can oﬀer a garbling of π that certiﬁes her type with
probability 1.
Finally, we say that experiment πe is sequentially redundant given Π if for every zπe−contingent
selection of experiments π(zπe) ∈ Π, where π(zπe) is selected whenever zπe occurs, there ex-
ists π′ ∈ Π such that {πe, π(zπe)} B π′. Trivially, every πe that is sequentially redundant
given Π must also be redundant given Π.
3 Non-positive Value of Expertise
How can a sender beneﬁt from gathering some information prior to choosing an experiment?
In the absence of cost diﬀerences among experiments, an informed sender may be able to
revert to an experiment that she believes more likely to induce the desired behavior in the
receiver. However, such interim information will not confer an advantage to the sender if her
private signal is sequentially redundant.
Proposition 1 We have that VU ≥ VI for all uS(a, θ) and uR(a, θ) if and only if πe is
sequentially redundant given Γ (Π).
The proposition clariﬁes that the informativeness of available experiments substitutes for
the sender’s expertise whenever these experiments make such expertise sequentially redun-
dant. Conversely, if πe is not sequentially redundant given Γ (Π), then an informed sender
can convey more information than an uninformed sender by a judicious choice of experiment
following each realization of πe. It is then easy to think of situations in which this could
be beneﬁcial to the sender. For example, suppose that sender and receiver share the same
preferences, and an uninformed sender oﬀers experiment π. Then, if the sender is privately
informed, she cannot be made worse oﬀ by credibly signaling the realization of πe and of-
fering π, so VU ≤ VI — and, in many situations, she can improve by adapting her choice of
experiment, so that VU < VI .
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The proof of the proposition hinges on the ability of an uninformed sender to replicate
through experiments in Γ (Π) both the informed sender’s private signal πe and her outcome-
contingent choice of experiment. For instance, if πe is redundant, then for each experiment
π ∈ Γ (Π), an uninformed sender can ﬁnd an experiment that replicates the information
revealed by an expert who discloses the outcomes of π and her private signal πe. Redundancy,
however, does not guarantee that an uninformed sender can also replicate an expert’s choice
of experiment. As Example 1 in the Introduction shows, an expert with redundant private
information can generate more informative experiments by conditioning her choice of a signal
on her type. To guarantee that the uninformed sender can replicate both πe and the informed
sender’s choice, her private signal must be sequentially redundant.
The main insight of Proposition 1 is that the informativeness of the public experiments
available to a sender can substitute for a sender’s lack of expertise when persuading a re-
ceiver. In fact, an important implication of Proposition 1 is that a sender with access to
a fully informative experiment can never beneﬁt from becoming informed, regardless of the
correlation of her private signal with experiments in Π.
Corollary 1 Suppose that A is a compact set and πFI ∈ Π. Then, VU ≥ VI .
As an illustration of the corollary, consider a prosecutor persuading a judge to convict a
defendant. If the prosecutor could submit any number of expert witness testimonies to the
judge, and could commit to a garbling of the submitted testimonies, she could never beneﬁt
from observing some (or all) of the actual ﬁndings.
To help with applications, we next provide a characterization of sequentially redundant
private signals. We will work with a minimal representation of available experiments to the
sender. We say that a set of experiments ΠB = {πi}i∈IB is linearly independent if for any
mixture λ such that πi′ B
∑
i∈IB λiπi we must have λi = 0 for i 	= i′.
Our characterization is framed in terms of the posterior beliefs induced by realizations
of diﬀerent experiments. Let Q (πi) be the set of posterior beliefs induced by experiment πi,
with Qij = Q (πi)∪Q (πj) , and Qijext = ext (conv (Qij)) the posterior beliefs that are extreme
points of the convex hull of Qij. Note that, whenever πe is strongly redundant given ΠB,
any posterior induced after observing zπe and the outcome of πi must belong to Q (πi).
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Proposition 2 Let ΠB = {πi}i∈IB be a ﬁnite set of linearly independent experiments.
(a) If πe is sequentially redundant given Γ (ΠB) , then (i) πe is strongly redundant given
ΠB, and (ii) for each i, j ∈ IB there exist non-negative numbers αij(zπe) ≥ 0, with
∑
zπe∈Zπe
Pr(zπe)αij(zπe) = 1,
so that for every q ∈ Qijext,
Pr i(q|zπe)− Pr j(q|zπe) = αij(zπe) (Pr i(q)− Pr j(q)) . (2)
(b) Let Q = ∪i∈IBQ (πi) and Qext = ext (conv (Q)). Suppose that Q (πi) ⊂ Qext for every
i ∈ IB. Then, πe is sequentially redundant given Γ (ΠB) if and only if there exist non-negative
numbers α(zπe) ≥ 0, with
∑
zπe∈Zπe Pr(zπe)α(zπe) = 1, so that for every i, j ∈ IB and q ∈ Q,
Pr i(q|zπe)− Pr j(q|zπe) = α(zπe) (Pr i(q)− Pr j(q)) . (3)
A property of the extreme beliefs Qext is that whenever q ∈ Qext is an outcome of a
mixture of garblings of experiments in ΠB, q can only be induced from realizations of ex-
periments πi that induced posterior q. While diﬀerent experiments may still induce diﬀerent
conditional distributions over beliefs in Qext after observing zπe , condition (2) shows that
their diﬀerence must always be proportional to the unconditional diﬀerence. This property is
necessary for an uninformed sender to replicate the distribution over posterior beliefs of any
zπe−contingent choice of experiment through appropriate mixtures of experiments in ΠB.
The next corollary provides an easy-to-verify necessary condition for sequential redun-
dancy.
Corollary 2 Let ΠB = {πi}i∈IB be a ﬁnite linearly independent set of experiments. Suppose
that πe is sequentially redundant given Γ (ΠB) and for some πi, πj ∈ ΠB and posteriors
q, q′ ∈ Qext, we have q ∈ Q (πi) , q′ ∈ Q (πj) but q /∈ Q (πj) and q′ /∈ Q (πi). Then, for all zπe
we have
Pri [q|zπe ]
Pri [q]
=
Prj [q
′|zπe ]
Prj [q′]
. (4)
The ratio Pri [q|zπe ] /Pri [q] represents the pointwise mutual information of the pair of
outcomes zπe of πe and q of πi —how much the likelihood of q under experiment πi is revised
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after observing zπe . Suppose that experiments πi and πj induce diﬀerent extreme beliefs q
and q′. The corollary shows that the pointwise mutual information conveyed by zπe about
q and q′ must be identical: experiment πe cannot lead to diﬀerent relative occurrences of
posteriors q and q′. Otherwise, knowledge of zπe can be used to generate q and q
′ at diﬀerent
relative frequencies.
As an application of this corollary, consider a linearly independent set ΠB of partitional
experiments π1 and π2, and a partitional πe (as in Example 1 in the Introduction). Then, it
is immediate that πe is strongly redundant given Π if and only if the partition induced by
πe is coarser than the one induced by every πi, i = {1, 2}. However, for πe to be sequentially
redundant, it must be that there exists at most one realization zπe such that the restriction
of experiments πi to zπe are distinct.
4 When does Redundant Expertise Beneﬁt the Sender?
Proposition 1 reveals that the sender cannot beneﬁt if her expertise is sequentially redundant.
Alternatively, if her expertise is not redundant, then her choice of signal could be used to
reveal her non-redundant information to the receiver. Consequently, if the receiver beneﬁts
from acquiring more information and players’ preferences are suﬃciently aligned, then the
sender can strictly beneﬁt from non-redundant expertise. In this section, we focus on the
intermediate case: when can the sender strictly beneﬁt from redundant, but not sequentially
redundant, information?
We can exploit the concaviﬁcation argument from KG to compute VU . However, com-
puting VI can be a much harder task. To overcome this problem, we ﬁrst consider a simpler
game in which the signal πe is publicly observed. We then provide conditions such that the
sender’s payoﬀ in this simpler game is a lower bound for VI .
Formally, consider an alternative game in which players publicly observe the realization
of πe before the sender chooses experiment π. After observing realization zπe ∈ Zπe , players
update their beliefs to q(zπe). The sender then chooses the signal π
∗(zπe) that maximizes
her expected payoﬀ — that is, she optimally selects a signal π∗ ∈ Γ (Π). Let Π∗Pub ≡
{π∗(zπe)}zπe∈Zπe be the set of optimal signals selected by the sender in equilibrium. Let Vzπe
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be the sender’s expected equilibrium payoﬀ after players publicly observe zπe and the sender
optimally selects π∗(zπe). The sender’s ex ante expected payoﬀ in this game is
VPub ≡
∑
zπe∈Zπe
Pr[zπe ]Vzπe .
Notice that computing VPub is typically a much simpler task than computing VI , as it only
requires repetitive use of the arguments in KG to solve for the optimal signals — we do not
have to worry about the receiver’s interim beliefs about the sender’s private information.
Consequently, it is often simpler to verify if the sender beneﬁts from public information
(verify if VPub > VU) than it is to verify if the sender beneﬁts from private information
(verify if VI > VU).
If πe is privately observed by the sender, however, then she may not achieve VPub in
equilibrium. Indeed, a strategy for the sender that selects π∗(zπe(t)) may not constitute
a separating equilibrium if a type t prefers the receiver’s choice under π∗(z′πe) when the
receiver interprets signal π∗(z′πe) as being oﬀered by type t
′. The next proposition provides
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which each privately informed
sender chooses the same signal as the publicly informed sender, which implies that VI ≥ VPub.
The proposition exploits a property of strongly redundant experiments: if the sender oﬀers
experiments that makes πe strongly redundant, then the receiver would not revise his beliefs
if she were to observe the actual realization of πe.
Assumption (A1) (Monotone Preferences) For all a, a′ ∈ A and θ, θ′ ∈ Θ
(uS(a
′, θ)− uS(a, θ)) (uS(a′, θ′)− uS(a, θ′)) ≥ 0.
To simplify notation, let A ⊂ R and uS(a′, θ) ≥ uS(a, θ) for a′ > a and θ ∈ Θ.
Proposition 3 Suppose (A1) holds.
(i) If there exists a selection of public optimal signals π∗(zπe), zπe ∈ Zπe, such that πe is
strongly redundant given Π∗Pub ≡ {π∗(zπe)}zπe∈Zπe , then VI ≥ VPub.
(ii) If πe can be replicated by each π ∈ Π, then VI ≥ VPub. In particular, if πe and all signals
in Π are partitional, with πe coarser than each π ∈ Π, then VI ≥ VPub.
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To prove the ﬁrst part of the proposition, we construct a separating equilibrium in which
each type t sender selects an experiment π∗(zπe(t)) that would be optimal if zπe(t) were
publicly observed. Strong redundancy implies that, on the equilibrium path, no sender
beneﬁts from mimicking another type’s choice. In a sense, by oﬀering experiments that
make her private information strongly redundant, the sender is “letting the evidence speak
for itself” — the receiver’s interim belief after observing the choice of signal π∗ ∈ Π∗Pub does
not aﬀect his posterior belief after observing the realization zπ∗ of π
∗.
Assumption (A1) allows us to form inferences oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path that discipline
the sender to avoid signals not used in equilibrium. When the receiver observes realization
zπ˜ of a signal π˜ /∈ Π∗Pub, the receiver’s interim belief about the sender is such that it leads
him to choose the worst action from the point of view of all senders (cf. Assumption (A1)).
Therefore, oﬀering π˜ oﬀ-the-equilibrium leads to (weakly) lower actions that if π˜ were oﬀered
by type t when the realization of πe were public. Therefore, type t cannot gain from oﬀering
π˜ /∈ Π∗Pub instead of π∗(zπe(t)).
The proof of part (ii) shows that if the sender’s private signal can be replicated with each
π ∈ Π, then there is a set of optimal signals that make her private signal strongly redundant.
For instance, for a ﬁxed zπe , she can construct a bidimensional garbling with one dimension
that is perfectly correlated with her type t while the other dimension provides the outcome
of experiment π∗(zπe). In particular, if πe and all signals in Π are partitional, with πe coarser
than Π, then πe can be replicated with each π ∈ Π and we must have VI ≥ VPub.
We can then use Proposition 3 as a suﬃcient condition for the sender to strictly beneﬁt
from redundant information.
Corollary 3 Suppose (A1) holds and there exists a selection of optimal experiments π∗(zπe)
such that πe is strongly redundant given Π
∗
Pub ≡ {π∗(zπe)}zπe∈Zπe . If the sender strictly
beneﬁts from publicly observing πe, then she strictly beneﬁts from privately observing πe,
VPub > VU ⇒ VI > VU .
For instance, in Example 1 in the Introduction, if we assume that the realization of πe
is public, then it is easy to verify that VPub > VU — the sender strictly beneﬁts from the
ability to adapt her choice of experiment to the actual realization zπe . Moreover, (A1) holds
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and πe and all signals in Π are partitional, with πe coarser than Π. Therefore, Proposition
3(ii) implies that VI ≥ VPub and the sender strictly beneﬁts from privately observing πe.
5 When does Redundant Expertise Hurt the Sender?
Proposition 1 shows that a sender cannot beneﬁt from observing a sequentially redundant
private signal. We now study cases in which the sender is actually hurt by this interim
information—that is, situations in which VU > VI . The fact that expertise can be detrimental
resonates with some applications in which information limits the ability to persuade decision
makers. For instance, failure to take a polygraph often leads to a negative update on a
defendant’s innocence. Furthermore, in some cases, failure to submit to DNA testing in
paternity lawsuits automatically assigns paternity to the non-compliant.
To obtain a sharp characterization, we restrict our attention to the following case:
Assumption (A2) Π = {πˆ} and πe can be replicated with πˆ.
As Π consists of a single experiment πˆ and πe can be replicated with πˆ, Assumption (A2)
implies that πe is also sequentially redundant and Proposition 1 establishes that VU ≥ VI .
One important case that satisﬁes (A2) is the case of partitional experiments πe and πˆ, with
πˆ corresponding to a ﬁner partition than πe.
We allow for the possibility that the uninformed sender’s game admits multiple optimal
experiments, and we let Π∗U be the set of such optimal experiments. When studying the set
of type-dependent equilibrium payoﬀs, we show that one can without loss restrict attention
to pooling equilibria if (A2) holds. That is, the ability to replicate one’s type allows a sender
to sustain any vector of equilibrium payoﬀs by pooling on a single experiment.
While the restriction to pooling equilibria resembles the inscrutability principle of Myer-
son (1983), our result is based on the statistical properties of available experiments relative
to πe. Following Myerson (1983), we could allow ex-post communication by the sender and
posit that all sender types select a single experiment and then communicate the information
about their type revealed in an equilibrium. In principle, this would be possible if, for in-
stance, πe is sequentially redundant, as one could always ﬁnd an experiment π ∈ Γ(Π) that
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replicates the same distribution over realizations as the one induced by any given equilibrium
(cf. Proposition 1). However, sequential redundancy is not suﬃcient for the distribution over
receiver’s actions conditional on each sender’s type to be the same as in the given equilib-
rium. As we show in the proof of Proposition 4, a pooling equilibrium can replicate both
the sender’s and receiver’s equilibrium payoﬀs if, instead, (A2) holds.
We then show that a sender is strictly worse oﬀ when privately informed if and only if,
for every optimal experiment π∗U ∈ Π∗U , she cannot pool in equilibrium and oﬀer π∗U . Let
v∗π∗U (t) be the interim expected utility of a type t sender when all types pool on experiment
π∗U . From Section 4, recall that Vzπe (t) is the value of persuasion when sender and receiver
publicly observed the realization zπe(t).
Proposition 4 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. Then, VU > VI if and only if
min
π∗U∈Π∗U
max
t∈T
[
Vzπe (t) − v∗π∗U (t)
]
> 0. (5)
To understand the proposition, we ﬁrst compute the lowest interim expected utility for
a type t in any equilibrium of the informed sender game. In the proof of the proposition,
we show that, when the receiver updates in the most adverse way following the experiment’s
realization of an out-of-the-equilibrium deviation, the sender can always improve her payoﬀs
from such deviation by simultaneously replicating her type. This implies that the minimum
expected utility that a type t can guarantee herself in any equilibrium is Vzπe (t).
We can now interpret (5). Condition (5) implies that, for every optimal experiment
π∗U ∈ Π∗U , there is some type t′ with Vzπe (t′) > v∗π∗U (t′). Therefore, pooling on π∗U cannot be an
equilibrium of the informed-sender game. To wit, the informed sender is hurt by her exper-
tise if, for every optimal pooling experiment, some type would prefer to oﬀer an experiment
that both “certiﬁes” her type and is an optimal experiment when her type is public.
Under the conditions in Proposition 4, pooling is sustained in equilibrium because possible
deviations are made unproﬁtable by eliciting the receiver’s most adverse update. The ability
of the sender to certify her type, coupled with the most adverse update by the receiver, allows
us to characterize the lowest individually rational payoﬀ that each type can obtain in any
equilibrium. Considering reﬁnements of signaling games that may rule out certain inferences
would certainly make pooling less likely and would widen the gap between the uninformed
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and the informed senders’ payoﬀs. Situations where the sender cannot replicate her type may
in turn allow the sender to sustain payoﬀ proﬁles that are not attainable through pooling
equilibria. We leave these investigations for future research.
6 Application: Persuading Consumers
We next present an application that illustrates our results. To persuade a consumer (re-
ceiver), the seller (sender) can design a public signal (test of the product or marketing
campaign) that allows the consumer to learn about his true valuation of the product — see
Johnson and Myatt (2006) for many examples of how a ﬁrm can provide real information
to consumers, allowing them to learn of their personal match with a product. Our applica-
tion captures many important market features: (i) the consumer often faces a menu with
several diﬀerent possible options, (ii) he is uncertain about how important for him are the
many diﬀerent features of the products, and (iii) the seller has some control over what the
consumer can learn, by strategically designing product tests and the informational content
of marketing campaigns.
Formally, consider a consumer who must choose which product to buy. For concreteness,
suppose it is a smartphone. The consumer can buy one phone from brands A, B or C, or
the consumer can choose not to buy a phone. Brand C is a more expensive and advanced
phone, while brands A and B are cheaper but have very distinctive features. The consumer
is not familiar with the diﬀerent brands and types of phones, so he is uncertain about which
phone is the best match for his needs. This uncertainty is captured by the unknown state
θ ∈ {AH,AL,BH,BL,C}, and players have a uniform prior belief over these states. State
θ = C implies that brand C is the best match and the consumer should buy phone C. State
θ = AH implies that brand A is the best match and it has a high consumption value (above
price), so the consumer should buy A. State θ = AL implies that brand A is the best match
but it has a low consumption value (below price), so the consumer should not buy a phone.
Similarly, state θ = BH implies that the consumer should buy B, while θ = BL implies that
he should not buy a phone.
Let q be the consumer’s posterior belief. To streamline the presentation, we assume that
the consumer’s optimal action follows a simple rule. The consumer buys phone C if and
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only if he is certain that this is the best option, Pr(θ = C) = 1. The consumer buys phone
A if and only if Pr(θ = C) + Pr(θ = AH) ≥ 0.8 and Pr(θ = BH) + Pr(θ = BL) = 0.
That is, the consumer has great disutility if he buys phone A when his type is B, but he
continues to value phone A if his type is C. Similarly, the consumer buys phone B if and
only if Pr(θ = C)+Pr(θ = BH) ≥ 0.8 and Pr(θ = AH)+Pr(θ = AL) = 0. The consumer
does not buy a phone in the remaining cases.
A retailer proﬁts from selling the phones. The retailer’s payoﬀ from selling a C phone is
12, while her payoﬀ from selling an A or B phone is 10. The retailer receives zero if she does
not sell. We next consider two types of retailers.
Constrained Retailer: Consider a retailer that is constrained on the experiments that she
can oﬀer to a consumer. She only has access to two partitional experiments, Π = {πA, πB}.
Experiment πA reveals partitions {AH}, {AL}, {BH,BL} and {C}. Experiment πB reveals
partitions {AH,AL}, {BH}, {BL} and {C}. That is, both experiments can easily identify
if the consumer’s type is A, B, or C. However, for types A and B, the retailer needs to use
the targeted test πA or πB to diﬀerentiate between a high and a low value from consumption.
This captures the natural assumption that a more speciﬁc experiment is needed to test the
consumer’s valuation of the distinctive features of each brand.
If the retailer has no private information, then the following is an optimal experiment.
The retailer garbles πA and designs a test with two realizations, S = {sA, s0}. States
C and AH induce realization sA with probability one, while partition {BH,BL} induces
realization s0 with probability one. State AL induces realizations sA and s0 with equal
probability. Upon observing sA, the consumer’s posterior belief becomes Pr(θ = C) = 0.4,
Pr(θ = AH) = 0.4, Pr(θ = AL) = 0.2, and Pr(θ = BH) = Pr(θ = BH) = 0. The
consumer then chooses to buy A. The consumer does not buy a phone if she observes s0.
Figure 1(a) illustrates how this constrained and uninformed retailer bundles the diﬀerent
states into the diﬀerent recommendations to the consumer. The retailer’s expected payoﬀ is
(0.2 + 0.2 + 1
2
× 0.2)× 10 + 0 = 5. Note that this retailer does not ﬁnd it optimal to sell the
more expensive phone C. It is more proﬁtable to bundle type C and type A consumers. The
same optimal payoﬀ can be attained by a similar garbling of πB.
Now suppose that the retailer can acquire private information. For example, the retailer
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Uninformed Retailer
Figure 1: Retailer’s Equilibrium Recommendations to the Consumer
can hire an expert salesperson that is trained to quickly identify the consumer’s type. The re-
tailer’s private signal πe identiﬁes partitions {AH,AL}, {BH,BL} and {C}. In this case, the
privately informed retailer can no longer bundle consumers with type C. In equilibrium, if the
retailer learns that the consumer is C, she will always provide this information and the con-
sumer will buy phone C. If the retailer privately observes partition {AH,AL}, then she gar-
bles πA as to maximize the probability of the consumer buying phone A, given that the con-
sumer understands that the state is not C. For instance, upon observing partition {AH,AL},
the retailer implements a binary signal S = {sA, s0}. State AH induces realization sA with
probability one; state AL induces realization sA with probability 0.25 and s0 with probability
0.75; the remaining states induce s0 with probability one. A similar garble of πB is optimal
when the retailer learns that the state is in partition {BH,BL}. Figure 1(b) illustrates how,
in equilibrium, the informed retailer bundles the states into diﬀerent recommendations. The
retailer’s expected payoﬀ is 0.2× 12+ (0.2+ 0.25× 0.2)× 10+ (0.2+ 0.25× 0.2)× 10 = 7.4.
Note that our application satisﬁes the conditions of Proposition 3(ii) and Corollary 3, so
that our constrained sender strictly beneﬁts from becoming an expert.
Unconstrained Retailer: Now suppose that the retailer has access to a fully informative
signal, Π = {πFI}. If she does not have private information, then the following is an optimal
experiment. She implements an experiment with three realizations, S = {sA, sB, s0}. State
C induces realizations sA and sB with probability 0.5 each. For j ∈ {A,B}, state jH
induces realization sj with probability one; state jL induces realization sj with probability
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0.375 and realization s0 with probability 0.625. Consequently, the consumer buys a phone
j when he observes sj, and she does not buy a phone when she observes s0. Figure 1(c)
illustrates how this unconstrained and uninformed retailer bundles the states into diﬀerent
recommendations. The retailer’s expected payoﬀ is (0.1 + 0.2 + 0.375 × 0.2) × 10 + (0.1 +
0.2 + 0.375× 0.2)× 10 + 0 = 7.5. Note that the uninformed retailer prefers to bundle type
C with types A and B.
Finally, suppose that the retailer can acquire private information πE — she can hire
the same expert salesperson from the previous example, who can quickly identify partitions
{AH,AL}, {BH,BL} and {C}. In this case, the informed sender can no longer commit to
bundle a type C with the other types. In our application, the optimal experiment of the
unconstrained informed sender results in the same distribution over buyers’ actions as in the
previous example with a constrained informed sender — See Figure 1(b). In both cases, the
retailer’s expected payoﬀ is 7.4.
Note that our application satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 4, so that our uncon-
strained sender strictly loses from becoming an expert.
In summary, our application captures the fact that consumers are often overwhelmed by
a long menu of choices. If the retailer does not have access to a fully informative test, then
she may beneﬁt from an expert salesperson who is able to select the best experiment for each
particular consumer. Hence, we can think about the case of companies strategically train-
ing their salesforce, or the ﬁrm’s executives gathering information prior to designing their
marketing strategies. However, if the retailer has access to a fully informative test, then
she might be worse oﬀ if workers and executives have private information, as they might be
unable to withhold disclosure of this information to the consumers.
7 Conclusion
When is an expert a more eﬀective persuader? If a sender has access to a set of certiﬁable
public signals (experiments), observing a private signal prior to choosing an experiment may
allow her to revert to an experiment that elicits a more desired behavior in a receiver. How-
ever, we show that the informativeness of public experiments substitutes for the sender’s
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expertise: an uninformed sender can always achieve the payoﬀs of an expert if she has access
to experiments that are suﬃciently informative. Our key condition (sequential redundancy)
ensures that an uninformed sender can always replicate both the expert’s private signal and
her ensuing choice of experiment. Perhaps surprisingly, redundant private information may
still be valuable to the sender when it allows her to choose between experiments that carry
diﬀerent information.
An important implication of our analysis is that a sender can never beneﬁt from becoming
an expert when a fully informative public experiment is available. We then show that
expertise may be detrimental to a sender if pooling on the uninformed sender’s optimal
experiment is not an equilibrium on the informed-sender game. In these situations, the
sender could beneﬁt from strategic ignorance — taking steps to guarantee to the receiver
that she did not acquire private information. For instance, the prosecutor might prefer not
to meet a particular witness, so that the judge knows that she did not ask the witness
exploratory questions before the trial. Similarly, a retailer with access to a fully informative
experiment might prefer to hire uninformed salespeople, while a constrained retailer might
prefer to hire expert salespeople.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Suﬃciency: We prove suﬃciency without requiring A to be
ﬁnite. Furthermore, we will show that every joint distribution over payoﬀs and the state
achieved in equilibrium by an informed sender can be replicated by an uninformed sender.
This trivially implies that VU ≥ VI .
Consider an equilibrium of the informed sender game in which the sender selects an
experiment according to the mixing σ(π|t) with support Πt ⊂ Γ (Π) , and denote by πσ the
corresponding sequential experiment induced in equilibrium, where the receiver observes ﬁrst
the chosen experiment π and then its realization. Sequential redundancy implies that there
exists a mixture {λi}i∈I so that
πσ B
∑
i∈I
λiπi.
Thus, there exists a garbling of
∑
i∈I λiπi that generates the same joint distribution over
posterior beliefs and the state as πσ (Blackwell 1953).
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Necessity: As in Perez-Richet (2016), let Φ(π) denote the set of distributions over A × Θ
induced by decision rules based on the outcome of experiment π, and note that Φ(π) is
compact and convex in [0, 1]|A|×|Θ|. Clearly, for any garbling π˜ of π we have Φ(π˜) ⊆ Φ(π).
If one considers mixtures over experiments in Π, then the set of distributions over A × Θ
induced by decision rules based on arbitrary mixtures of experiments in Π coincides with
Φ(Γ(Π)) = conv (∪π∈ΠΦ(π)), which is clearly convex. Finiteness of Π implies that Φ(Γ(Π))
is compact.
Suppose that πe is not sequentially redundant given Γ(Π). Then, there exists a sequential
experiment πσ described by a randomized selection rule σ(.|zπe), with support Πzπe ⊂ Γ (Π) ,
so that σ(π|zπe) is the probability of choosing experiment π ∈ Πzπe after realization zπe ,
and such that for every mixture λ we have πσ B
∑
i∈I λiπi. Therefore, there exists a
joint distribution ϕ(a, θ) induced by selecting actions according to the outcome of πσ such
that ϕ(a, θ) /∈ Φ(Γ(Π)) (Perez-Richet 2016). The separating hyperplane theorem ensures the
existence of a payoﬀ function u(a, θ) such that
∑
A×Θ
ϕ(a, θ)u(a, θ) > W (Π, u) = max
ϕ′∈Φ(Γ(Π))
∑
A×Θ
ϕ′(a, θ)u(a, θ),
where W (Π, u) denotes the maximum expected payoﬀ of a decision maker with utility u(a, θ)
when making decisions based on mixtures of experiments in Π. Consider, then, a sender-
receiver game in which uR(a, θ) = uS(a, θ) = u(a, θ). A type t sender can select after each
zπe(t) a mixture σ(π|zπe(t)) that has the same distribution over states and outcomes as πσ
(by relabeling, if necessary, the outcomes of πσ). This constitutes a separating equilibrium
of this persuasion game in which the sender credibly signals her type and thus VI > VU .

Proof of Corollary 1: It follows from the suﬃciency proof of Proposition 1, which does
not require A to be ﬁnite, and the fact that every πe is sequentially redundant given Γ(Π) if
πFI ∈ Π. 
Lemma A1: Suppose that πa B
∑
j∈IB λ
a
jπj and πb B
∑
j∈IB λ
b
jπj. Then, for α ∈ [0, 1],
we have απa + (1− α)πb B
∑
j∈IB
(
αλaj + (1− α)λbj
)
πj.
Proof of Lemma A1: Let Mkj be a Markov matrix representing the garbling of experiment
πj such that, for k ∈ {a, b}, the mixture
∑
j∈IB λ
k
jπj followed by the garbling M
k
j of πj,
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j ∈ IB, has the same distribution over outcomes as πk. Now consider the garbling of the
mixture
∑
j∈IB
(
αλaj + (1− α)λbj
)
πj where, for any j such that αλ
a
j + (1 − α)λbj > 0, the
outcome of experiment πj is garbled according to the Markov matrix
αλaj
αλaj + (1− α)λbj
Maj +
(1− α)λbj
αλaj + (1− α)λbj
M bj .
It is then immediate to verify that such experiment generates the same distribution as
απa + (1− α)πb. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (a)(i)- Sequential redundancy implies that, for each i ∈ IB,
there exists a mixture λi such that {πe, πi} B
∑
j∈IB λ
i
jπj. But, then, πi B
∑
j∈IB λ
i
jπj
and linear independence implies λij = 0 for i 	= j, so that {πe, πi} B πi. As πe is strongly
redundant, the set of posterior beliefs induced by jointly observing the realization of πe and
πi, i ∈ IB, is contained in Q (πi).
Part (a)(ii)- If ΠB has a single element then (2) is trivially satisﬁed.
4 Suppose, then, that
ΠB has at least two elements. To simplify notation, let τi and τi(zπe) denote the distribution
over posterior beliefs, both with support on Q = ∪i∈IBQ (πi) , induced by experiment πi and
by experiment πi conditional on observing realization zπe−so τi(q) = Pri(q) and τi(zπe)(q) =
Pri(q|zπe). Deﬁne
Δi,j(q) = τi(q)− τj(q), (6)
Δi,j(zπe)(q) = τi(zπe)(q)− τj(zπe)(q).
The proposition then states that there is αij(zπe) ≥ 0 so that
Δi,j(zπe)(q) = αij(zπe)Δi,j(q), (7)
for every q ∈ Qijext. Multiplying both sides of (7) by p(zπe) and adding over zπe ∈ Zπe implies
that
∑
zπe∈Zπe Pr(zπe)αij(zπe) = 1.
We now prove (7). Consider the experiment π˜ij,zπe constructed as follows: if zπe is realized
then it selects experiment πi, otherwise it selects experiment πj, j 	= i. Denote by τ˜ij,zπe the
4This would be the case for a general set of experiments Π if Π admits a most informative experiment
according to the Blackwell information order.
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induced distribution on Q. Sequential redundancy implies that there are weights μkij,zπe ≥ 0
with
∑
k∈IB μ
k
ij,zπe
= 1 and
π˜ij,zπe B
∑
k∈IB
μkij,zπeπk.
Let R = card(Zπe) be the number of outcomes of experiment πe. Then we have
∑
zπe∈Zπe
τ˜ij,zπe =
∑
zπe∈Zπe
(τj + p(zπe)Δi,j(zπe)) = Rτj + (τi − τj) ,
so that ∑
zπe∈Zπe
1
R
τ˜ij,zπe =
1
R
τi +
(
1
R
− 1
)
τj.
Repeated application of Lemma A1 to the mixture of experiments
∑
zπe∈Zπe
1
R
π˜ij,zπe establishes
that
1
R
∑
zπe∈Zπe
π˜ij,zπe =
1
R
πi +
(
1
R
− 1
)
πj B
∑
zπe∈Zπe
∑
k∈IB
μkij,zπe
R
πk.
Linear independence of ΠB then implies
∑
zπe∈Zπe
∑
k =i,j
μkij,zπe = 0.
As μkij,zπe ≥ 0, we must then have μkij,zπe = 0 for each k 	= i, j and zπe ∈ Zπe . Therefore,
the experiment π˜ij,zπe can only be represented through a garbling of mixtures involving only
experiments πi and πj.
Consider now a belief q ∈ Qijext. The probability of posterior q under experiment π˜ij,zπe is
τ˜ij,zπe (q) = τj(q) + p(zπe)Δi,j(zπe)(q).
As q is an extreme point ofQij = Q (πi)∪Q (πj), it can only be induced by the same belief
induced after realizations of πi and πj. Sequential redundancy implies π˜ij,zπe B αij(zπe)πi+
(1− αij(zπe))πj for some αij(zπe) so that, for all q ∈ Qijext,
αij(zπe)τi(q) + (1− αij(zπe))τj(q) = τj(q) + p(zπe)Δi,j(zπe)(q),
which implies (7).
Part (b). Necessity. As all posteriors in Q are extreme, Q = Qext, then Part (a)(ii)
already showed Δi,j(zπe) = αij(zπe)Δi,j. We now show that αij(zπe) is constant across pairs i,
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j ∈ IB. Consider an experiment π˜ characterized by the collection of mixtures {λ (zπe)}zπe∈Zπe ,
with λi (zπe) the probability that experiment πi ∈ ΠB is selected after observing zπe , and τ˜
the induced distribution on Q. For a ﬁxed l ∈ IB, we have
τ˜ =
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)
(∑
i∈IB
λi (zπe) τi (zπe)
)
=
=
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)
(∑
i∈IB
λi (zπe) (τl(zπe) + αil(zπe)Δi,j)
)
=
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)
(
τl(zπe) +
∑
i∈IB
λi (zπe)αil(zπe)Δi,j
)
= τl +
∑
zπe∈Zπe
∑
i∈IB
p(zπe)λi (zπe)αil(zπe)Δi,j.
Setting
γil =
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)λi (zπe)αil(zπe),
and noting that γll = 0, we have
τ˜ = τl +
∑
i∈IB
γil (τi − τl) =
∑
i∈IB ,i =l
γilτi +
(
1−
∑
i∈IB ,i =l
)
τl.
Since πe is sequentially redundant given ΠB, and all posterior beliefs in Q are extreme
points, we must have that τ˜ belongs to the convex hull of {τi}i∈IB . This requires that, for
each possible choice of {λ (zπe)}zπe∈Zπe , we must have
∑
i∈IB ,i =l γil ≤ 1. Note that∑
i∈IB ,i =l
γil =
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)
∑
i∈IB ,i =l
λi (zπe)αil(zπe).
For each realization zπe , select i
∗
zπe
so that αi∗zπe l(zπe) = maxj∈IB αjl(zπe). The program
Vl = max
λ(zπe )
∑
i∈IB ,i =l
γil, s.t. λi (zπe) ≥ 0,
∑
i∈IB ,i =l
λi (zπe) ≤ 1,
is maximized by setting λj (zπe) = 1 iﬀ j = i
∗
zπe
. In this case, we have
Vl =
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)max
j∈IB
αjl(zπe) ≥
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)αkl(zπe) = 1
for every k ∈ IB, k 	= l, where the inequality is strict whenever maxj∈I αjl(zπe) > αkl(zπe)
for some zπe and k. Therefore, we must have that αkl(zπe) = maxj∈I αjl(zπe) = αl(zπe).
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Since αkl(zπe) = αlk(zπe), we then must have that αlk(zπe) is constant across all zπe for each
l, k ∈ IB.
Suﬃciency: It suﬃces to show that (3) implies that πe is sequentially redundant given
mixtures in ΠB. Consider an experiment πˆ characterized by the collection of mixtures
{λ (zπe)}zπe∈Zπe of experiments in ΠB, that induces a distribution τˆ on Q. Then with Δi,j =
τi − τj,
τˆ =
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)
(∑
i∈IB
λi (zπe) τi (zπe)
)
=
=
∑
zπe∈Zπe
p(zπe)
(∑
i∈IB
λi (zπe) (τk(zπe) + α(zπe)Δik)
)
= τk +
∑
zπe∈Zπe
∑
i∈IB
p(zπe)λi (zπe)α(zπe)Δik.
Deﬁne
κi =
∑
zπe∈Zπe
λi (zπe) p(zπe)α(zπe), i 	= k
κk = 1−
∑
i∈IB
κi.
Note that {κi}i∈IB satisﬁes κi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈IB κi = 1 and τˆ =
∑
i∈IB κiτi. Therefore, for each
sequential experiment πˆ, we can ﬁnd a mixture {κi}i∈I of experiments in ΠB with
πˆ B
∑
i∈IB
κiπi,
implying that πe is sequentially redundant given ΠB. 
Proof of Corollary 2: Follows immediately from (2) by setting for each q, q′ ∈ Qext
Pr i(q|zπe)− Pr j(q|zπe)
Pr i(q)− Pr j(q) = αij(zπe) =
Pr i(q
′|zπe)− Pr j(q′|zπe)
Pr i(q′)− Pr j(q′) .

Proof of Proposition 3: Part (i): Let aˆ(zπ, zπe) be the receiver’s equilibrium action after
publicly observing zπe and the realization of π. We show that the sender’s strategy π
∗ (t) =
π∗ (zπe(t)) and receiver’s choice a(zπ∗(t′)) = aˆ(zπ∗(t′), zπe(t
′)) after observing π∗ (t′) ∈ Π∗Pub and
its realization forms a separating equilibrium of the informed sender game. First, consider
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deviations oﬀ-the-equilibrium path to an experiment π˜ ∈ Γ (Π) with π˜ /∈ Π∗Pub, and suppose
that the receiver’s posterior action after observing zπ˜ satisﬁes a(zπ˜) = mint′∈T aˆ(zπ˜, zπe(t
′)).
That is, the receiver’s update oﬀ-the-equilibrium path assigns probability 1 to a type t′ that
leads to the lowest possible action consistent with the realization zπ˜ of π˜. Since aˆ(zπ˜, zπe(t)) ≥
a(zπ˜), then experiment π˜ induces a pointwise lower action oﬀ-the-equilibrium path than if the
sender’s type was observed by the receiver. Since each type t has available experiment π˜ when
πe is publicly observed, then type t cannot proﬁt from oﬀering π˜ when privately informed.
Second, consider on-the-equilibrium path deviations so that type t oﬀers π∗ (t′) instead
of π∗ (t). The strong redundancy assumption {πe, π∗ (zπe)} B π∗ (zπe) implies that the
receiver’s posterior belief after observing zπ∗(t′) is independent of his interim belief over T .
That is, type t cannot gain by mimicking another type t′ when the set of type-dependent
optimal experiments makes the private signal strongly redundant. As π∗ (t′) is available to
type t when types are public, then she cannot gain by selecting π∗ (t′) instead of π∗ (t).
Part (ii): Let I index the experiments in Π. We now show that if πe can be replicated
with πi, i ∈ I, then there exists a selection of experiments πˆzπe , zπe ∈ Zπe , that makes
πe strongly redundant given Π
∗
Pub ≡ {πˆzπe}zπe∈Zπe . Fix a realization zπe and an optimal
public experiment π∗(zπe). Suppose that π
∗(zπe) is generated by a mixture μze of garblings
g∗i,ze , π
∗(zπe) =
∑
i∈I μi,ze
(
g∗i,ze ◦ πi
)
. Since πe can be replicated with πi, i ∈ I, there ex-
ists a garbling gi of πi satisfying (1). The bidimensional garbling g˜i,ze of πi with outcome(
g∗i,ze ◦ πi, gi ◦ πi
)
also replicates πe. Then, the bidimensional experiment πˆzπe ,
πˆzπe =
∑
i∈I
μi,ze
(
g∗i,ze ◦ πi, gi ◦ πi
)
,
which is a garbling of the mixture μze , satisﬁes
{
πe, πˆzπe
} B πˆzπe .
Finally, suppose that πe and all signals in Π are partitional, with πe coarser than each
π ∈ Π. Then each π ∈ Π can replicate πe and, combining parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3,
we have VI ≥ VPub. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Step 1) We show that, for any equilibrium of the informed-
sender game, (A2) guarantees the existence of a pooling equilibrium with the same type-
dependent payoﬀs. To see this, consider an equilibrium in which the sender selects an
experiment according to the mixing σ(π|t) with support Πt ⊂ Γ (Π) and let Π′ = ∪t∈TΠt.
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Let {1, ..., J} index the set Π′. As Π = {πˆ} , every πj ∈ Π′, j ∈ {1, ..., J}, is a garbling of
the same experiment πˆ.
Let π˜e be a garbling of πˆ that replicates π˜e. Consider the multidimensional experiment
π′ = (π1, ..., πJ , π˜e) which is a garbling of πˆ. We now construct an experiment πP from
π′ that can be supported in a pooling equilibrium and it induces the same type-dependent
payoﬀs as the original equilibrium. From π′, experiment πP reveals zπP = (j, zπj) with
probability σ(πj|t˜), where t˜ is the type associated to the realization of zπ˜e .That is, πP selects
an experiment in (π1, ..., πJ) according to the mixing in the original equilibrium where,
instead of type t, it uses the outcome of the experiment π˜e.
First, as π˜e replicates πe, we have that for each type t, Pr [zπ˜e = t|t] = 1. Therefore, the
conditional distribution over experiments in the original equilibrium, given by σ(π|t), is the
same as the conditional distribution σ(πj|t˜) of the pooling equilibrium given the realization
of π˜e. Thus, it is a sequentially rational response for the receiver to select the same actions
after observing (j, zπj) as in the original equilibrium.
Second, since Pr [zπ˜e = t|t] = 1 and all experiments are garblings of πˆ, we must then have
that for each experiment πj, Pr
[
zπj |t
]
= Pr
[
zπj |zπ˜e = t
]
. Therefore, the type-dependent
payoﬀs are the same when pooling on πP as in the original equilibrium, and any deviation
from pooling can be made unproﬁtable by the same inference oﬀ-the-equilibrium as in the
original equilibrium. Thus, pooling on πP is an equilibrium of the informed sender game.
Step 2) (Suﬃciency) We prove the contrapositive. Thus, suppose that VU = VI . Then,
there is an equilibrium of the informed sender game that achieves the same ex-ante expected
payoﬀ as the equilibrium if uninformed. From Step 1, we must have an equilibrium in which
all types pool on some experiment πp with πp ∈ Π∗U . As πp is an equilibrium, each type
cannot proﬁt from certifying her type, so
max
t∈T
[
Vzπe (t) − v∗πp(t)
]
≤ 0,
thus violating (5).
Step 3) (Necessity) We ﬁrst show that the minimum payoﬀ a sender can obtain by deviat-
ing from a pooling equilibrium is weakly higher if it also replicates her type. Let a (zπ, μ) be
the receiver’s action after observing realization zπ when he assigns probability μt to type t,
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and let a(zπ) = minμ∈conv(T ) a(zπ, μ). Suppose that type t deviates from a pooling equilibrium
by oﬀering experiment π′ which is a garbling of πˆ. Consider the bidimensional experiment
(π′, π˜e) which is again a garbling of πˆ. As (π′, π˜e) allows the sender to replicate its type,
then we must have
a(zπ′) ≤ a((zπ′ , zπ˜e)),
where zπ˜e = t with probability 1. Therefore, the minimum payoﬀ that a sender can obtain
in any equilibrium is achieved when she “certiﬁes” her type. This is formally equivalent to
Vzπe (t).
We prove that if (5) does not hold, so that for some π∗U ∈ Π∗U we have
Vzπe (t) ≤ v∗π∗U (t), t ∈ T, (8)
then pooling on π∗U is an equilibrium of the informed sender game and VU = VI . Suppose
that, after observing any deviation from π∗U to an alternative experiment π
′ and observing
its realization zπ′ , the receiver selects the action a(zπ′). Then, the maximum payoﬀ that
a type t would obtain from such deviation is Vzπe (t). Given (8), no type would proﬁt from
deviating, and pooling on π∗U is an equilibrium. 
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